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A FRIENDLY AMENDMENT
LARRY YACKLE∗

Heather Gerken comes to praise Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Supreme
Court in United States v. Windsor.1 I come to praise Gerken’s valiant effort to
recast the Windsor opinion along more convincing lines.2 Gerken does not
propose a wholesale substitute for Justice Kennedy’s analysis. She suggests a
shift in emphasis that lends Kennedy’s explanation for condemning DOMA a
surprising jurisprudential significance. Where some us have seen yet another
lamentable paean to the sovereignty of the states, Gerken detects the faint hint
of the “nationalist” school of federalism that she and others have nurtured in
recent years.3 Gerken does not (yet) attach relevant significance to Justice
Kennedy’s predicate holding that Windsor presented the question of DOMA’s
validity in a justiciable posture. I want to contend that there, too, Kennedy may
have recognized (implicitly and even more faintly) that the values we should
associate with federal structure are not well served by sovereignty-based
allocations of power.
I
The soul of the Windsor opinion was Justice Kennedy at his best. As he did
in Lawrence v. Texas4 and Romer v. Evans,5 here, too, Kennedy knew gay
bashing when he saw it. Quoting Justice Brennan, he declared that a federal
statute cannot rest on “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group.”6 Yet that is precisely what DOMA was. Proponents in
∗
Professor of Law and Yanakakis Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School
of Law. Talia Quartetti helped with the research for this comment.
1 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking
Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2015).
2 Cf. WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID (J.M. Balkin ed., 2005) (presenting a
variety of alternatives).
3 See Symposium, Federalism as the New Nationalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1888 (2014).
Professor Gerken does not argue that Justice Kennedy actually intended to base the Windsor
decision on the framework the nationalist school supplies, but expressed himself poorly. Nor
does she predict that Kennedy and his colleagues will embrace nationalist federalism any
time soon. Yet her “internalist account” of the opinion does offer additional support that is
generally consistent with some of what Kennedy wrote, whatever he meant. Gerken, supra
note 1, at 608-09.
4 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
6 Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973).
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Congress conceded it, and everybody watching knew it. The whole point of the
statute, its very “essence” to use Justice Kennedy’s term, was to demean
persons who find love in LGBT relationships. It is this aspect of the Windsor
opinion on which some lower courts have now relied in part to confirm that the
freedom to marry extends to same-sex partners.7 The flimsy rationales
concocted for denying marriage to LGBT couples only prove what the real
explanation has always been. People may fear, and they may hate. They may
hold intolerant religious commitments. But they cannot constitutionally write
their personal anxieties and attitudes into law. This is the lasting triumph of
Windsor, a lonely piece of evidence that there may still be some hope for
humankind, after all.
Trouble is, Justice Kennedy clouded this long-overdue message with an
appeal to state “sovereign authority within our federal system.”8 Now quoting
Chief Justice Rehnquist, he said that the “‘regulation of domestic relations’ is
‘an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the
States.’”9 And he described the marriages that DOMA denigrated as
relationships on which the State of New York had chosen, in the exercise of its
traditional authority, to confer “protection and dignity” going “further” than
the Court’s prior decisions demanded.10 Gerken acknowledges that this was no
casual observation.11 With undeniable care and consistency, Justice Kennedy
repeatedly linked the constitutional flaw in DOMA to an attempt to “injure the
very class New York [sought] to protect.”12 The challenge of the Windsor
opinion is to account for the connection between the individual rights Justice
Kennedy plainly vindicated and a particular state’s decision to recognize samesex marriage.
It’s clear that Justice Kennedy did not mean to say that DOMA simply
exceeded some structural limitation on congressional authority. He explicitly
declined to decide whether the “intrusion on state power” regarding marriage
violated “the Constitution” by “disrupt[ing] the federal balance.”13 That
disclaimer brought relief to the quarters in which I move, where it had been
feared that the justices would do the right thing for the wrong reason.14 Justice

7 E.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1207 (10th Cir. 2014). Of course, the validity
of state bans on same-sex marriage was not before the Court in Windsor. United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (2013) (limiting the holding to marriages “lawful” under state
law).
8 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
9 Id. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
10 Id. at 2692.
11 Gerken, supra note 1, at 609.
12 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
13 Id. at 2692.
14 Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Genna Sinel, The Gay Marriage Cases and Federal
Jurisdiction (Northwestern Law & Econ Research, Working Paper No. 14-18), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2505514 (contending that DOMA was unconstitutional “because
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Kennedy has figured prominently in the Court’s notorious decisions striking
down enactments of the Congress on nebulous, text-free grounds traveling
under the vague (and outdated) label of “dual sovereignty.”15 In Windsor, we at
least eluded that leaden missile. In point of fact, Kennedy described
congressional legislative power expansively, without express objection from
the dissenters.16
Justice Kennedy explained that “[t]he State’s power in defining the marital
relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart from principles of
federalism.”17 New York’s use of “its historic and essential authority to define
the marital relation” to include same-sex relationships “enhanced the
recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community.”18
DOMA was unconstitutional because it used “this state-defined class” not for
the purpose the state itself contemplated, but rather to “impose restrictions and
disabilities.”19 These passages were confusing in the least and, in one way,
ominous. Professor Gerken identifies the issue precisely. Kennedy may have
meant that it was only New York’s approval of same-sex marriage that
elevated the individual interests at stake sufficiently to make the Fifth
Amendment case against DOMA.20
This is where Gerken extends a helping hand. Justice Kennedy did not
necessarily say, and he did not necessarily mean, that Congress went
constitutionally wrong in DOMA by interfering with sovereign state policymaking power. True, the conventional account of federalism holds that state
sovereignty ensures that national political minorities can sometimes find a safe
haven at the state level.21 Yet the Windsor opinion can be read to perceive,
Congress did not have the enumerated power to adopt a federal marriage statute”).
15 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997). In Printz, of course, the Court upset
the recruitment of state executive officers to implement a federal statute while conceding
that there was “no constitutional text” speaking to the issue. Id. at 905. In Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999), Justice Kennedy delivered an opinion that four members of the Court
later declared so bereft of justifying authority that it could not be taken as authoritative.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97-98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ.).
16 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690 (stating that the Federal Government “has a wide choice
of the mechanisms and means” by which to “exercise its own proper authority”); id.
(explaining that “Congress has the power both to ensure efficiency in the administration of
its programs and to choose what larger goals and policies to pursue”).
17 Id. at 2692 (emphasis added).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Gerken, supra note 1, at 601 (acknowledging that Justice Kennedy wrote as though
individual constitutional rights were “contingent on their recognition by the states”).
21 Not long ago, Justice Thomas contended that sovereignty-based federalism “enhances
self-government by creating a local decision-making system that is closer to the people, and
hence more responsive to their wishes” and described the states as “organizers of resistance
to the unwarranted exercise of federal powers.” Clarence Thomas, Justice, U.S. Supreme
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however dimly, a federalism of a quite different order. The nationalist school
values federalism not because it grants dissenters an “exit option,” but rather
because it guarantees them an opportunity to use local governmental units as
“staging grounds” for promoting change in the nation as a whole.22 Kennedy
might have, should have, understood that federalism and individual rights
function together—the one providing the effective political structure in which
the other can flourish.23 By this account, DOMA was unconstitutional because
it crushed the efforts of political outsiders to foster progressive change at the
local level before it could gain traction on a wider scale.24
I confess some doubts about nationalist federalism in general and the
contribution it may make to understanding Windsor in particular. Many of us
think the Court’s sovereignty decisions are wrong. For one thing, federalism
(of any stripe) was never inevitable in this country. The early states were only
the product of the way this part of the world was invaded.25 For another,
structural arrangements can be expected to change as a society develops, and it
is pound foolish even to try to forestall evolutionary shifts, however
significant.
The sovereignty-based federalism we have is very much the creation of the
judges, and a poor fist they have made of it. Things could have been different,
especially during Reconstruction. Consider how the system might look now if
the Slaughterhouse Cases,26 Hans v. Louisiana,27 and Murdock v. Memphis28
had gone the other way. The current Court’s insistence that sovereignty-based
federalism fosters personal freedom is largely a scam. Structural arrangements
sell better when they are packaged as bulwarks of liberty. Even if there were
something to the argument, it would hardly make sense to preserve individual
freedom by enforcing state sovereignty and hoping for the best. That is what
Court, Why Federalism Matters, Dwight D. Oppenheimer Lecture at Drake University Law
School (Sept. 24, 1999), in 48 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 235, 237 (2000).
22 Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7,
10 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Foreword].
23 Gerken, supra note 1, at 601.
24 Id. at 600.
25 By common account, the principal drafters in Philadelphia would have abolished the
states, but caved to political reality. E.g., John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform
Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 799, 814 (1961), reprinted in THE FORMATION AND
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 490 (Hall ed., 1987). Cf. MALCOLM M. FEELEY &
EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY & TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008)
(explaining that federalism is typically found in other nations where populations are so
divided by religion or language that they can tolerate no central governmental authority).
26 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (giving the Privileges or Immunities Clause a notoriously
grudging interpretation).
27 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the states enjoy sovereign immunity against private
suits pressing federal claims).
28 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (holding that the Supreme Court has no appellate
jurisdiction to review state court decisions on the meaning of state law).
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the Court does, or says it does.
The nationalist project to adjust the conventional federalism picture faces a
daunting linguistic hurdle. In legions of other cases, the Supreme Court plainly
takes federalism to mean that states qua states enjoy some measure of
autonomy that both insulates them from some federal overrides and guarantees
their authority to fashion local policy.29 It’s hard enough to wean the legal
system from imprecise terms. It is ever so much harder to redefine terms of art.
Yet that is what Gerken proposes. She herself uses the federalism label, but her
definition is entirely different, missing out the sovereignty piece and revealing
her nationalist agenda. Thus her “stand in” for federalism is “the best way to
protect minorities in a majority system.”30 If I have this right, Gerken does not
insist that federalism must be shed of its tie to sovereignty. She just thinks we
can ignore sovereignty and use federalism interchangeably with
decentralization—in defiance of common nomenclature.31
One might see this as academic hubris. Yet the stakes being as high as they
are, we should consider the possibility that Gerken and her cohorts might
succeed, that they might seize control of this familiar term and transform its
meaning. If Gerken can reformulate the federalism definition, she might free us
of the burdens we bear for sovereignty. The rest of us regret that the
sovereignty monster is upon us and yearn for another New Deal to be rid of it
(again). But we should open our minds to an alternative. I am reminded of the
29

E.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008) (affirming “the general
principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce
their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees”).
Federalism is widely understood to describe systems with autonomous subunits as opposed
to centralized governmental schemes that may accommodate decentralization. FEELEY &
RUBIN, supra note 25, at 12, 20. Compare Alexander De Becker, Local Government in
Belgium: A ‘Catch 22’ Between Autonomy and Hierarchy (describing Belgium as a “federal
state”), in LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 26 (Panara & Varney eds., 2013), with Irene
Couzigou, Territorial Decentralisation in France: Towards Autonomy and Democracy
(describing France as a “unitary, decentralized State”), in LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE,
supra, at 73.
30 Gerken, Foreword, supra note 22, at 13. While Gerken and her colleagues explore the
way local political action can contribute to national policy, they do not insist on national
uniformity as the ultimate end in view. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New
Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE. L.J. 1889, 1900 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken,
Federalism] (explaining that “local variation is perfectly consistent with a nationalist
scheme”). In this, the nationalist school comports with extant Supreme Court thinking. See
Danforth, 554 U.S. at 280 (stating that the states’ ability to make their own laws “is not . . .
limited by any general, undefined federal interest in uniformity”).
31 According to Gerken, we have already abandoned the notion that federalism is
crucially defined by reference to state sovereignty. See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 22, at
13 (contending that terms like “process federalism” and “cooperative federalism” would be
unintelligible otherwise). So, for example, academics should study the way local minorities
are able to make policy when there is no doubt that a sovereign override is available—as in
the case of cities, boards, commissions, and even juries. Id. at 21-28.
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day in Legal Process, when, at the end of another great class, Al Sacks
stopped, rolled down his sleeves, looked into our satisfied faces, and
announced that on the following day he was bringing Duncan Kennedy in to
explain why everything Sacks had been saying was wrong.
Gerken contends not so much that the Court has erected the wrong
federalism, and now insists on preserving the wrong federalism, but that the
federalism the Court has built and maintained is beside the point. The law in
the books is marginal to the law in action all around us.32 Our functional
structural arrangements have matured, leaving judicial decisions enforcing
state sovereignty as islands in the stream of events rushing past. It would be
nice to be done with sovereignty, but we needn’t worry much about it. We can
and should simply refocus our attention. The task is to study, comprehend,
analyze, and evaluate a growing body of arrangements in which state and local
governmental units participate in the development of national policy.33
Gerken concedes that the ideas that emerge from state and local politics do
not always move the nation ahead: “the gears of rights and structure can move
backwards, not just forwards.”34 For every local movement-become-law
recognizing same-sex marriage, banning plastic grocery bags, or raising the
minimum wage, there is another promoting carbon fuels, celebrating guns, or
demonizing fugitives from poverty and injustice south of the Rio Grande. On
this (crucial) point, Gerken is ambivalent. On occasion, she suggests that
nationalist federalism can play favorites. We are not required to empower
dissenters who are “disloyal to our fundamental ideals.”35 Yet she credits
retrograde campaigns as catalysts for a rich national debate that will produce
good results in its own time. When dissent is heard in a small enough space to
succeed, the truth will out. Citizens “dissenting by deciding” will do their
deciding well.36
The rest of us would like to believe this, but find it hard sledding. So far
from fostering enlightened social change, small venues can be pockets of
parochialism. Lest we forget, it is the self-centered resistance of the states (and
their congressional delegations) that so often disables progressive policymaking despite a national consensus.37 But, of course, it is precisely the
prevailing despair for American politics that we ought to resist by hearing

32

See Gerken, Federalism, supra note 30, at 1913.
Much of the work done by the nationalist school is “more interpretive than normative.”
Id. at 1895. It is investigative and “descriptive.” Id. at 1889. And so, I will add, it is genuine
scholarship.
34 Gerken, supra note 1, at 599-600.
35 Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE. L.J. 1958, 1992 (2014)
(contending that Justice Kennedy “insisted that states must have discretion to promote
marriage equality” but did not say “they may have just as much discretion to deny it”).
36 Id. at 1980.
37 Symposium, America’s Political Dysfunction: Constitutional Connections, Causes,
and Cures, 94 B.U. L. REV. 575 (2014).
33

2015]

A FRIENDLY AMENDMENT

647

Gerken out.
Nationalist federalism is an unlikely explanation for Windsor or, indeed, any
judicial decision invalidating federal action. Gerken herself thinks the national
government can trump policies adopted at the state and local levels.38 She
argues that national power should be stayed as a matter of constitutionally
inspired prudence to give local democracy a chance to breathe. Thus Windsor
prevented Congress from frustrating just such a local movement and in a case
in which small-space sentiments lined up with individual rights. Here again,
there is a dark side. The Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder,39 albeit
grounded in sovereignty-based federalism, removed a national safeguard for
free elections and enabled states to manufacture schemes that discourage
voting.40
When Justice Kennedy acknowledged the value of state-centered politics in
Windsor, he probably had in mind the threadbare claim that state sovereignty
protects individual liberty and local self-government from national usurpation.
He declared that New York had exercised its “sovereign authority” to make
judgments about marriage. But some of his verbiage is consistent with the
alternative, nationalist model. Kennedy said, for example, that New York “was
responding ‘to the initiative of those who [sought] a voice in shaping the
destiny of their own times.’”41 And he said that the state marriage law reflected
“both the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the
institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of
equality.”42
Gerken fairly mines these passages for hope that Kennedy recognized what
nationalist federalism embodies—namely, the insight that local engagement is
valuable well beyond the trope that the states can be laboratories for testing
ideas.43 The Windsor opinion may not be the thin edge of the wedge for
nationalist federalism. But since it resists any alternative explanation, we
should not assume it is the same blunt sovereignty instrument we have sadly
come to expect from this Court.44
38

Gerken, Foreword, supra note 22, at 10.
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)
40 Id. (invalidating the “coverage formula” in § 4 of the Voting Rights Act). See Jaime
Fuller, How Has Voting Changed Since Shelby County v. Holder?, WASH. POST THE FIX
(July 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/07/07/how-hasvoting-changed-since-shelby-county-v-holder/, archived at http://perma.cc/5ELQ-4XG2
(reporting that many states have adopted restrictions in the wake of the Court’s decision).
41 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (2013) (quoting Bond v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2355, 2359 (2011)). The line Kennedy quoted from his own opinion for the Court
in Bond was actually tucked into a paragraph citing state sovereignty as a shield against
national power.
42 Id. at 2692-93.
43 See Gerken, Federalism, supra note 30, at 1901.
44 Even as I say this and mean it, I must also say that it seems quaint to spend our
academic time pondering the structure of government in this or any single nation. Even if
39
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The more of this I read, the more I am convinced—to the point that the
picture Gerken describes seems not only plausible, but right, and not only
right, but irrefutable. We have been looking for federalism in all the wrong
places. This is unsettling, of course, to academics who have spent our careers
worrying through a marvelously complex and unruly system of law and
institutions that no one can master. Now it turns out that we have been
flummoxed by the easy stuff. The legal system we actually have is a lot more
complicated, exponentially complicated. But if the world we are investigating
is on the move, we had best get in step with it.
II
There is another arguably complementary point to be made about Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor. Before he reached the merits, Kennedy had
first to explain how it was that the case was fit for adjudication. Recall that,
soon after Edith Windsor initiated her suit in the district court, Attorney
General Holder announced that the United States would not defend DOMA as
a valid explanation for denying Windsor the usual tax exemption for surviving
spouses. Justice Scalia insisted that what had been a justiciable dispute was at
that point no longer a “controversy” for purposes of Article III.45 Justice
Kennedy countered that the “complication” created by the Government’s
position was a “prudential” matter the Court could defuse in the exercise of
judgment.46
Justiciability jurisprudence, too, is grounded in the sovereignty idea—
specifically, a pervasive faith that governmental authority is distributed among
the branches of the national government, each of which is confined within
formally circumscribed bounds. The Court scarcely pauses to consider whether
the separation of powers reflects a realistic view of the modern regulatory
state. Or to ask whether it is normatively attractive. For the justices, separation
is simply there to be enforced as a constitutional mandate. I wonder, then, if
Justice Kennedy’s softer-than-usual approach to justiciability in Windsor is
worth a passing nod.
I would not contend that Windsor signals a programmatic tendency to
classify justiciability doctrine as federal common law. The evidence suggests a

we were able to revise our thinking about federalism and sovereignty for the good of our
own country, the gain would be modest. Civilization is collapsing worldwide because
sovereign nations can’t manage the cooperation necessary to prevent wars and pestilence,
far less to stop or even slow the devastation of the natural environment. Then again, some of
us somewhere may yet beat the odds and survive, necessarily in isolated enclaves. And there
might just be a chance, brought on by necessity, to begin in small spaces to construct a
better world for the future, if any there is. I very much doubt it. But Heather Gerken has put
me in a hopeful mood.
45 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 2685 (majority opinion).
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pending move in the other direction.47 But if the prerequisites for access to the
Article III judiciary were not packed in constitutional ice, the courts might be
in a better position to monitor and accommodate the local social and political
movements of which Heather Gerken speaks. Here again, it is important to say
that Gerken’s nationalist federalism mainly lives (and perhaps thrives) without
benefit of judicial attention. Yet, in Gerken’s view, at some point it’s necessary
to decide that a local initiative has blossomed into something of national
moment. Would it be too much to suggest that in reaching the merits in
Windsor, while at the same time deflecting the question in Hollingsworth v.
Perry,48 the Court was grappling with the “rule of recognition” problem
regarding the freedom to marry?49 Probably.
Still, if Justice Kennedy’s treatment of the merits in Windsor reflects a
vague appreciation of structural values apart from sovereignty, it may be that
his handling of justiciability at least bears watching for similar symptoms.
Perhaps there will come a day when we will escape the formalism that has
impoverished Supreme Court decisions about access to the courts for decades.

47

See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3
(2014) (questioning judicially crafted “prudential” standing rules).
48 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (holding that the proponents of the California prohibition on
same-sex marriage lacked standing to seek review of a circuit court decision declaring the
ban unconstitutional).
49 See Gerken, supra note 1, at 604.

